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I. INTRODUCTION
Expert opinion on the quality of international humanitarian law's
provisions for the protection of women diverges. The official position of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), recognized in the Ge-
neva Conventions as the guardian of international humanitarian law (IHL),
• Karima Bennoune is an Associate Professor at Rutgers School of Law-Newark who
formerly served as a Legal Adviser for Amnesty International. She would like to thank Pro-
fessor Claire Dickerson for helpful comments, and Ms. Jillie Richards for her fine research
assistance. This Article was supported by funding from the Dean's Research Fund at Rutgers
School of Law-Newark.
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is that sufficient rules exist in IHL to prevent violence against women in
armed conflict. In the organization's view, the real problem is the failure to
implement this law. According to the ICRC, "If women have to bear so
many of the tragic effects of conflict, it is not because of any shortcomings
in the rules protecting them, but because those rules are not observed."' It
repeatedly calls on governments to respect and implement the existing rules.
For example, as Frangoise Krill wrote in the International Review of the
Red Cross in 1985:
If women in real life are not always protected as they should be, it is not
due to the lack of a legal basis .... The international community will not
succeed in remedying this situation merely by adopting new rules. Most of
all, it must see that the rules already in force are respected. 2
This view would seem to underscore the importance of the role of interna-
tional criminal law, which is precisely about implementing IHL's prohibi-
tions. It hints that the pressing task is not looking backward to "fix" hu-
manitarian law, but rather looking forward toward its aggressive
implementation and development through, inter alia, the practice of interna-
tional criminal law. This writer has heard the same view expressed by senior
staff of some major human rights NGOs.
On the other hand, a number of contemporary feminist critics have
suggested that some aspects of the IHL rules regarding women are archaic
and reflect the very stereotypical ideas about women that perpetuate dis-
crimination. Given the identification of a crucial link between discrimina-
tion and violence against women, including in the conflict context, this as-
sertion is particularly significant. For example, Judith Gardam and Michelle
Jarvis concluded in 2000, "[i]t is apparent from a comparison between the
reality of armed conflict for women... and the existing relevant norms of
international law, that the latter are inadequate." ' This view suggests that
implementation of extant IHL through international criminal courts alone,
though an important step, may not entirely remedy the problem. Instead,
perhaps something must be done to modernize IL, itself, in light of ad-
vances in understanding violence against women in conflict, especially
those advances made in international human rights standards.4
1 Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Women and War, at 26, Aug. 1995 [hereinafter Women
and War].
2 Frangoise Krill, The Protection of Women in International Humanitarian Law, 249
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 337, 359 (1985).
3 Judith Gardam & Michelle Jarvis, Women and Armed Conflict: The International Re-
sponse to the Beijing Platform for Action, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 1, 56 (2000).
4 The relationship between IHL and international human rights law is a complicated one,
explicated in a growing body of literature. See, e.g., Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vitd,
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 293 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 94
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This article will briefly explore these dichotomous views to assess
how adequately IHL addresses women's experiences of conflict, and what,
if anything, should or could be done to remedy any of the gender-related
shortcomings identified in IHL.
II. HARMS TO WOMEN IN CONFLICT
A. Overview
To assess feminist claims regarding the failures of IHL to distill
women's experiences of war,5 this article begins with an overview of find-
ings in the literature regarding those experiences. 6 The international com-
munity has formally acknowledged in Security Council Resolution 1325
that "civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast major-
ity of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and
internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants
and armed elements ... Violence against women in war is widespread,
often systematic, multi-faceted, and heinous. Reports come from all regions
of the world and a variety of sources.
The forms of gender-based abuse8 of women and girls in armed
conflict that are most frequently documented in literature include: 9
(1993). These two bodies of law have different goals, different philosophies, and different,
though overlapping, spheres of application. While the aim of IHL has been described as to
"preserve humanity in the face of the reality of war," human rights law aims higher at effect-
ing systems of repression and denial. UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT
SHEET No. 13: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 17 (1991). Else-
where this author has critiqued the use of IHL to the exclusion of human rights law in judg-
ing the effects of armed conflict. See generally Karima Bennoune, Toward a Human Rights
Approach to Armed Conflict: Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 171 (2004). Still
the idea that human rights law can inform the ongoing development of humanitarian law (and
has done so) has been increasingly recognized. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, The Humanization
of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (2000). For further discussion of human rights
law's protections for women in conflict, see generally Amnesty International, Making Rights
a Reality: Violence Against Women in Armed Conflict, AI Index ACT 77/049/2004, June,
2004.
5 The preferred term in the legal context is "armed conflict." "War" as a legal term of art
has largely been jettisoned from IHL. For stylistic reasons, I use the terms interchangeably,
echoing the ICRC, which recently campaigned on "Women and War." See Women and War,
supra note 1 (emphasis added).
6 Some forms of abuse to women in conflict may overlap. A detailed list is included for
specificity. Unfortunately, even this list is not exhaustive, but rather exemplary.
7 SC Res. 1325, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000), reprinted in 40 I.L.M.
500 (2001).
8 In the view of the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), "gender-based violence . . . is . . .violence that is directed
against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately." U.N.
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 19,
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* rape
" sexual abuse and assault
" deliberate infection with HIV/AIDS
" pornography and recording of sexual violence
" sexual mutilation
" medical experimentation on sexual and reproductive organs
" enslavement and sexual slavery
" forced marriages or cohabitation
" pregnancy complications, birth defects, and sterility following expo-
sure to toxic or prohibited weapons
" gender based forms of arbitrary detention and de facto arbitrary deten-
tion
" forced impregnation
" forced pregnancy and abortion; enforced sterilization
" strip-searching, forced public nudity, and sexual humiliation
" forced veiling or unveiling
" trafficking in women and girls
* enforced prostitution
* failure to grant refugee status for gender-based harms
Other types of abuses prevalent during conflict may have a disproportionate
or gender-specific impact on women. These include deliberate or indis-
criminate attacks on the civilian population, the detention of women in con-
ditions designed for men or without the presence of female guards, or forced
displacement and expulsions. Similarly, the deprivation of economic, social,
and cultural rights in conflict situations has a particular impact on women.
This includes:
* house destruction, demolition, and expropriation
" property destruction and confiscation
" denial and withholding of humanitarian assistance
" shortage of food, leading to malnutrition (cultural custom may man-
date that women and girls are fed last)
Violence Against Women, 6, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (Jan. 29, 1992), available at http://www.
unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/300395546e0dec52c12563ee0063dc9d?Opendocument
[hereinafter General Recommendation 19].
9 Sources from which this list has been compiled include, JUDITH G. GARDAM &
MICHELLE J. JARvIS, WOMEN, ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001);
ELISABETH REHN & ELLEN JOHNSON SIRLEAF, WOMEN, WAR AND PEACE: THE INDEPENDENT
EXPERTS' ASSESSMENT ON THE IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON WOMEN AND WOMEN'S
ROLE IN PEACE-BUILDING (2002); and The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence
Against Women, delivered to the UN. Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2001/73 (Jan. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur's Report] (prepared by
Radhika Coomaraswamy).
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" lack of adequate sanitary conditions and supplies, especially during
menstruation and lactation
" loss of education and employment
" lack of adequate medical care and rehabilitation, including reproduc-
tive and maternal health care
" increased burden of care responsibilities
Furthermore, the effects of gender-based abuses suffered during times of
conflict are magnified by discrimination against women, and may endure
long after armed conflict has ended. Examples include:
* "unmarriageability" or loss of a spouse after rape or amputation due to
landmines or other injury during conflict
* discrimination against mothers of children produced by conflict-related
rapes
" the derogatory perception of victims as "fallen," "dishonored," or "dis-
graced"
" "shame" imposed on the family
" the practice of honour killings, suicides, and self-inflicted harm follow-
ing sexual abuse or rumors of such abuse
" impunity for perpetrators of gender-based harms
" the perception of women as "secondary" victims of conflict
" the increase in so-called ordinary violence against women
Does all of this amount to violence against women, or are some of
these occurrences and discriminatory impacts merely tragic side effects of
conflict? In considering this question, it is interesting to note that the most
recent human rights instrument to be adopted to combat violence against
women takes a broad approach to defining violence against women that
might encompass the wide range of abuses against women listed above. The
African Union Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, defines "vio-
lence against women" to include:
all acts perpetrated against women which cause or could cause them
physical, sexual, psychological, and economic harm, including the threat
to take such acts; or to undertake the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on
or deprivation of fundamental freedoms in private or public life in peace
time or during situations of armed conflict[] or war.10
Such a comprehensive approach represents the emerging way the human
rights regime understands conflict-related violence against women.
10 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women
in Africa, art. 1(j), adopted July 11, 2003.
2006-2007]
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B. Perpetrators
In times of strife, it must not be forgotten that women face harm at
the hands of a wide range of public and private actors. Invading soldiers
may rape and murder. Armed groups may kidnap women and force them to
fight. Even those sent by the international community to help, such as aid
workers or peacekeepers, may sexually harass or abuse women. Further-
more, "ordinary" violence against women and girls, such as domestic vio-
lence, child abuse, battering, rape, or female genital mutilation, may be ex-
acerbated by the pressures of a conflict situation. Protection or redress for
such violence may be even more unavailable than usual due to the break-
down of law enforcement efforts. Agents of a state may be viewed as
threatening in the context of a conflict, and women may be unwilling or
unable to cooperate with them.
Thus, women and girls face a grim array of violence, harm, and
deprivation from a number of quarters during conflict. They may be sur-
rounded on all sides by these potential threats, including what the Former
UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women has called threats of
"unimaginable brutality," without safe haven." These abuses are not exclu-
sively comprised of sexual violence, though such violence certainly looms
as a constant and horrific possibility. The full picture must be considered to
grasp women's experience in conflict and as a standard by which to judge
whether international law responds appropriately.
C. Discrimination and Women in Armed Conflict
The contemporary understanding of the multifaceted phenomenon
of conflict-based violence against women grounds this web of harm not
simply in the workings of war, but also in ongoing, pervasive discrimination
against women and their quotidian subordination. 12 Discrimination against
women may function in any or all of the following ways: (1) as a violation
per se, (2) as a cause of violations in conflict, (3) as a factor which com-
pounds violations in conflict, or (4) as an obstacle to adequate remedies for
abuses.
In the view of many feminist scholars, wartime violence against
women, though an immediate product of the crucible of conflict, is also
related to "peacetime"'13 assaults on and attitudes about women.' 4 Thus,
"1 Special Rapporteur's Report, supra note 9, at 14.
12 See, e.g., REHN & SIRLEAF, supra note 9, at 13. The Committee on the Rights of the
Child has also made reference to the fact that "the traditional inferiority affecting girls' lives
is seriously aggravated" during time of armed conflict and emergency. Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 296, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 43.
13 Some feminist scholars have questioned the meaning of "peacetime" for women, by
noting that it is not necessarily reflective of women's experience of violence. They may
[Vol. 38:363
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success for the continuing struggle against sex discrimination is a sine qua
non for effectively curtailing or preventing violence against women in con-
flict. Recent international standards reflect this view. For example, the Bei-
jing Platform for Action points out that "women and girls are particularly
affected [by violence in armed conflict] because of their status in society
and their sex." 15 This seems to suggest an even greater urgency for ridding
IHL of any lurking discriminatory notions.
The CEDAW Committee, created to monitor implementation of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, introduced this connection to the world of international standards
when, in 1992, it issued the ground-breaking General Recommendation No.
19.16 This recommendation sets out that gender-based violence is a form of
discrimination, and one that gravely affects women's enjoyment of their
human rights.17 With specific reference to armed conflict, the Recommenda-
tion makes clear that gender-based violence that impairs or nullifies "[t]he
right to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in time of interna-
tional or internal armed conflict" is covered by the Convention as a form of
discrimination.' 8 In 1993, the UN General Assembly Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence against Women further proclaimed:
[V]iolence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full ad-
vancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the cru-
commonly experience grave, even lethal, levels of violence during "the time called peace."
See, e.g., Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender.- Re-Engraving Crimes Against Women in
Humanitarian Law, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 243, 248 (1994). See also Bridget Byrne,
Towards a Gendered Understanding of Conflict, in GENDER AND PEACE SUPPORT
OPERATIONs 30 (2002), available at http://www.genderandpeacekeeping.org/resources/3_
Towards_aGenderedUnderstanding of Conflict.pdf (last visited March 12, 2007).
14 The ICRC has recognized this reality, though without using the term, "discrimination."
See Women and War, supra note 1, at 7. It answered the question, "Why are women more
vulnerable than men?," by noting: "Even in peacetime, women are often handicapped in that
education, health and nutrition are not readily accessible to them. Moreover, they are often
victims of violence within their own families and communities or at the hands of the State."
Id.
is Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, P.R.C., Sept. 4-15, 1995, Beijing Decla-
ration and Platform for Action, 135, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 177/20 ( Sept. 15, 1995) [herein-
after Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action].
16 Rather remarkably, as a product of the times in which it was drafted, the Women's
Convention, adopted in 1979, does not employ the word "violence" once in its entire text.
See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. General Recommendation No. 19 seeks to fill this lacuna.
See General Recommendation 19, supra note 8.
17 General Recommendation 19, supra note 8, I.
18 Id. 7(c).
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cial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate po-
sition compared with men .... 19
Other related and often overlapping discriminations, such as those
based on race, ethnicity, and religion also frequently motivate and perpetu-
ate violence against women in conflict. The Durban Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action, which emerged from the 2001 UN World Conference
against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intoler-
ance, has underscored that "the intersection of discrimination on grounds of
race and gender makes women and girls particularly vulnerable to [sexual
violence used as a weapon of war], which is often related to racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. 20
Undoubtedly, recent human rights standards have embraced this ho-
listic view of violence against women, as both a cause and consequence of
women's subordination in society and inherently linked to pervasive forms
of discrimination against women. Conflict creates a free-fire zone, a sort of
"free-for-all," in which pre-existing ideas about women as inferior, and
other discriminatory and misogynist ideas, may be given free expression by
frequently all-male groups of soldiers or other combatants. It is within this
framework that violence against women in armed conflict should be under-
stood; as a (perhaps gross) magnification of "ordinary" violence and atti-
tudes, but not as an aberration. Bearing in mind this sketch of women's lives
in conflict and of contemporary human rights understandings of the same,
we now proceed to consideration of IHL's response.
HI. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
A. Introduction
In many ways, IHL represents a tremendous legal achievement as
an international consensus on limiting the methods and means of warfare
19 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 104, pmbl.,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994), available at http://www.
unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.RES.48.104.En?Opendocument [hereinafter
Declaration]. All forms of gender-based violence against women in armed conflict are
clearly included within the scope of the Declaration which specifies its relevance to "vio-
lence occurring in the family ..." in article 2(a), "violence occurring within the general
community..." in article 2(b), and "violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever
it occurs... in article 2(c). Id. art. 2(a)-(c). Furthermore, the preamble specifically registers
"[c]oncem[] that some groups of women, such as ... refugee women ... and women in
situations of armed conflict, are especially vulnerable to violence." Id. pmbl.
20 World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related
Intolerance, Durban, S. Afr., Aug. 31-Sept. 8, 2001, Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action, 54(a), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 189/12 (Jan. 1, 2002).
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designed to minimize the suffering caused.21 Additionally, in judging IHL,
one must be sensitive to temporal considerations. The core of conventional
IHL is comprised of the Four Geneva Conventions adopted in 194922 (as
explicated by the authoritative Commentaries published by the ICRC be-
tween 1952 and 1960)23 and their two Additional Protocols adopted in
1977.24 As noted above, it has only been since the early 1990s that interna-
tional human rights standards have begun to address seriously violence
against women.
Each of the treaties noted has a somewhat different focus. Geneva
Conventions I and II cover wounded and stranded soldiers on land and sea,
respectively, while Geneva III regulates the treatment of prisoners of war,
and Geneva IV focuses on the lives of civilians in times of war and occupa-
21 IHL has been subjected to a driving critique suggesting that it actually thereby legiti-
mizes warfare itself, a topic beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Chris af Jochnick &
Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35
HARV. INT'L L.J. 49 (1994).
22 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Ge-
neva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV]. All four of the Conventions entered
into force on 21 October 1950, and all 194 states in the world currently are party to the Con-
ventions. See International Committee of the Red Cross, States Parties to the Following
International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 8-Mar-2007, http://www.
icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_maintreaties/$File/IHL-and other-relatedTreaties.pdf.
[hereinafter States Parties]. There are also important principles of customary international
law in the area. See, e.g., JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS AND LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW (1989).
23 COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE
WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter
Commentary I]; COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE
CONDITION OF WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA (Jean
S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans. 1960) [hereinafter Commentary II); COMMENTARY:
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet
ed., A.P. de Henry trans. 1960) [hereinafter Commentary III]; COMMENTARY: GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (Jean S.
Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin et al. trans. 1958) [hereinafter Commentary IV].
24 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3. [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. [hereinafter Protocol II]. As of March 2007, 167
states are parties to Protocol I, and 163 states are parties to Protocol II. See States Parties,
supra note 22.
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tion. Women and girls do sometimes serve as combatants, a growing reality
which must not be overlooked. However, they most often fit into the civil-
ian category. Thus, the Fourth Geneva Convention, and the analogous pro-
visions relating to internal armed conflict, are particularly relevant to them.
With the exception of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the
four Conventions relate exclusively to international armed conflict. Less
protection is afforded in internal conflict, which is covered only by Com-
mon Article 3 and Protocol II, than in international conflict. This distinction
has been likened by some feminist scholars to the lower level of protection
offered by classical interpretations of human rights law for harms in the
"private" sphere.
2 5
Women are theoretically to benefit, just as men are supposed to,
from the general protections offered by IHL, including those shielding the
wounded, combatants, and persons detained in connection with an armed
conflict.26 However, in addition to the general provisions of IHL, there are
some rules that are gender-specific. According to the ICRC, of the five hun-
dred and sixty articles comprising the law of Geneva, approximately fifty
provisions from the Conventions and Protocols deal with non-
discrimination or otherwise provide "special protection for women., 27 Much
in this regime, which specifically sought to address ways women functioned
during and had been affected by World War II, should be lauded. Yet, in
light of current understanding of women's human rights, there is a fair
amount to criticize, particularly in some of the unfortunate wording to be
found in the Commentary on the key texts.28
B. Non-Discrimination
The 1949 Conventions and the 1977 Protocols establish a principle
of equality to the effect that "no adverse distinction can be drawn between
individuals on the basis of, inter alia, sex."29 This principle is reflected, for
example, in Article 12 of the First and Second Conventions, which require
humane treatment of persons in the power of parties to the conflict. They
25 See, e.g., Catherine MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights, in
MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 183, 193 (Alexandra
Stiglmayer ed., Marion Faber trans., 1994).
26 See Commentary II, supra note 23, art. 12, 4, at 92.
27 Women and War, supra note 1, at 6. Francoise Krill estimates rather that "about 40
provisions are of specific concern to women." Krill, supra note 2, at 359.
28 One must be careful in assigning precise legal status to the Commentary. According to
the ICRC itself, "[a]lthough published by the International Committee, the Commentary is
the personal work of its authors." Commentary IV, supra note 23, at 1 (referring to the fore-
word produced by the International Committee of the Red Cross). Still, they are often seen as
authoritative.
29 GARDA & JARVIS, supra note 9, at 61 (emphasis added).
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prohibit "any adverse distinction founded on sex . . . or any other similar
criteria" in such treatment.30 Article 2(1) of Protocol II repeats this language
with respect to the internal armed conflicts it covers.31
Note that it is only adverse distinctions which are banned, and as
Gardam and Jarvis conclude, "[d]ifferentiation on the basis of sex is thus
permissible as long as its impact is favourable. 32 For example, sex may be
considered, as well as several other factors, in determining if labor is appro-
priate for a particular prisoner of war33 or the quality and quantity of bed-
ding and blankets for internees in occupied territory. 34 The ICRC Commen-
tary on the Fourth Geneva Convention seems to clearly appreciate the need
for a careful approach: "Equality might easily become injustice if it was
applied to situations which were essentially unequal, without taking into
account such circumstances as the . . . sex of the protected persons con-
cerned. 35 This certainly seems to be a positive approach on the part of IHL,
overcoming problems asserted by feminist legal scholars with overly formal
views of equality.
C. "Special Protections "for Women
In addition to non-discrimination, the touchstones of IHL's gender-
related provisions are general precepts that, standing alone, do not entail
specific obligations, but are important for understanding the philosophical
approach of women's HL. The goals of these rules, taken together, have
been described as "to either reduce the vulnerability of women to sexual
violence, to directly prohibit certain types of sexual violence, or to protect
them when pregnant or as mothers of young children.' 36 An example may
be found in Article 12 of the First and Second Geneva Conventions, which
states: "Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex. 37
The Commentary suggests that this provision is "an example of a favourable
distinction made compulsory. 3 8 This sounds generally like a good idea and
could have a range of positive connotations. However, the relevant Com-
mentary, which was published in 1960 by the ICRC, explains it as follows:
"What special consideration? No doubt that accorded in every civilized
30 Geneva I, supra note 22, art. 12; Geneva II, supra note 22, art. 12.
31 Protocol II, supra note 24, at art. 2(1).
32 GARDAM & JARVI, supra note 9, at 61. This is confirmed in Krill, supra note 2, at page
339.
33 Geneva III, supra note 22, art. 49.
34 Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 85.
35 Commentary IV, supra note 23, art. 27, 3, at 206.
36 GARDAM & JARvIs, supra note 9, at 63.
37 Geneva I, supra note 22, art. 12; Geneva II, supra note 22, art. 12.
38 Commentary II, supra note 23, art. 12, 4, at 92.
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country to beings who are weaker than oneself and whose honour and mod-
esty call for respect."3 9 Feminist scholars of IHL have justifiably criticized
this language and the view of women that seems to underpin it.
40
Another example of a general provision is Article 14 of the Third
Geneva Convention, referring to women prisoners of war: "Women shall be
treated with all the regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit by
treatment as favourable as that granted to men."4' Turning again to the
ICRC Commentary, one finds that the key points to be taken into considera-
tion in deciphering the meaning of this somewhat vague provision are the
following: "weakness," "honour and modesty," and "pregnancy and child-
birth. '42 "Weakness," a most unfortunate word choice and one that is
somewhat absurd given the amount of strength involved in childbearing,
seems intended to refer to women's particular physical capacity. On the
positive side, such particularity is to be considered when selecting appropri-
ate working conditions and food they must receive. "[H]onour and mod-
esty" is an old-fashioned way of referencing the intention to protect women
from sexual abuse and other "indecent assault." Finally, special treatment is
to be afforded to pregnant women whether they are pregnant when taken
prisoner, or as the Commentary notes ominously, "become pregnant in cap-
tivity despite the precautions taken.4
3
Women POWs must be treated as well as men, and in some ways
more favourably in a manner specific to their needs. While well-intentioned
and perhaps protective of women in conflict situations, the Commentary
indicates that this general principle was designed with a paternalistic view
of women in mind. It assumes chivalric attitudes, rather than pervasive dis-
crimination, as the ordinary societal stance toward women. This outmoded
attitude toward women colors the other gender-specific lHL norms.
1. Protections for Particular Categories of Women
In addition to the general provisions for the protection of all
women, certain categories of women are to be afforded particular treatment.
These specific rules are designed to meet the goals of the general provisions
discussed above.
31 Id., art 12, T4, at 92.
40 See, e.g., GARDAM & JARVIs, supra note 9, at 63.
41 Geneva III, supra note 22, art. 14.
42 Commentary III, supra note 23, art. 14, 2(2), at 147. Weakness refers to "lack of
strength, firmness, vigor or the like; feebleness," and also to "an inadequate or defective
quality." WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2152 (2001).
Honor is defined in relevant part as "chastity or purity in a woman." Id. at 918. Modesty
denotes "the quality of being... pure, virtuous." Id. at 1236.
41 Id., art. 14, 2(2), at 148.
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a. Women in Detention and Internment
A network of specific and important rules protects detained and in-
terned women impacted by conflict. Separate quarters and conveniences
must be provided for women prisoners of war (even during disciplinary
punishment),44 women internees (except when interned along with a family
unit), and other women detainees. 45 Female supervision is required for fe-
male POWs under disciplinary punishment (under the Third Geneva Con-
vention) and at all times (under Protocol 1); as well as for women internees
and detainees, including those in occupied territory, except when held with
a family unit.46 Women internees are to be searched only by women.47 In
interpreting the gender-specific provisions of the Geneva system, the ICRC
has written more broadly that this protection should apply to all women
detainees.48
A female POW cannot be sentenced or punished in a more severe
way than a female member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power
would be. Furthermore, a woman prisoner of war may, in no case, be
"awarded or sentenced to a punishment more severe, or treated whilst un-
dergoing punishment more severely, than a male member of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power dealt with for a similar offence. ' 49 Finally,
pregnant women and mothers with dependent infants "who are arrested,
detained or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict, shall have
their cases considered with the utmost priority. 50 Extra provision of food is
to be made, as needed, to such women. It certainly would be of enormous
benefit to women detainees in conflict were such specific rules respected.
They indeed cover a range of issues of key concern to women in war and
offer important safeguards.
Yet, in turning again to the Commentaries, one finds that it is not
women's rights to privacy or security of person that require gender-
44 Krill, supra note 2, at 354 (echoing the relevant Commentary, which indicates that
Article 14(2) of Geneva III implies that "the separation must be effective, in other words that
male prisoners must not have access to the dormitories of women prisoners whether or not
the women consent"). Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the Detaining Power to ensure
this separation. Id. It should be noted that this provision only explicitly relates to dormitories
and conveniences; quarters as a whole do not have to be separated. Id.
45 Geneva III, supra note 22, art. 25, 29, 97; Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 85; Protocol II,
supra note 24, art. 5(2)(a).
46 Geneva III, supra note 22, art. 97; Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 76; Protocol I, supra
note 24, art. 75(5); Protocol II, supra note 24, art. 5(2)(a).
47 Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 97.
48 See Women and War, supra note 1, at 11. See also Krill, supra note 2, at 340.
49 Geneva III, supra note 22, art. 88.
50 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 76(2).
51 Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 89.
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segregated conveniences but rather, the morally laden notion of "de-
cency., 52 It is to protect women's "honour and modesty," not their basic
rights to physical integrity or dignity, that they are afforded separate quar-
ters and female supervision during punishment.53 Instead of focusing on
respect for their persons as grounds for providing separate sleeping quarters
for women internees, the relevant Commentary suggests this is a manifesta-
tion of "the respect due to women's honour., 54 With regard to the prohibi-
tion on punishing a woman more severely than a man, the Commentary
simply states that this "affords a safeguard which corresponds to the princi-
ples of civilized nations," a rather remarkable assertion in light of the con-
temporaneous global treatment of women.55
b. Mothers and Pregnant Women
Further protection is offered to pregnant women and new mothers,
beyond the detention context. As Krill notes, pregnant women and mater-
nity cases are often "assimilat[ed] ... to the sick and wounded . . ." in the
Geneva law. 56 They are afforded special protection, usually, but not exclu-
sively, under this rubric. Mothers and pregnant women should receive spe-
cial treatment in regards to medical care.57 In addition to "maternity cases,"
hospitals, their personnel, and land and air vehicles must be protected and
respected; they may in "no circumstances be the object of attack., 58 States
must allow free passage of foodstuffs and supplies to pregnant women and
nursing mothers,59 and they are to receive priority in the distribution of re-
lief supplies.60
Beyond the provision of supplies, state parties must consider the
possibility of establishing safety zones for pregnant women and mothers
with children under the age of seven 6' and endeavor to evacuate "maternity
cases" from conflict zones.62 Attempts should be made at early repatriation,
release, or accommodation in a neutral country for pregnant women and
52 Commentary III, supra note 23, art. 29, 2, at 207.
51 Id. art. 97, 4, at 465.
54 Commentary IV, supra note 23, art. 85, 4, at 388.
55 Commentary III, supra note 23, art. 88, 3, at 434.
56 See, e.g., Krill, supra note 2, at 348. In fact, rather alarmingly, the heading of the Com-
mentary on Art. 91, 2 of Geneva IV is entitled, "Maternity Cases. Serious Diseases."
Commentary IV, supra note 23, art. 91, 2, at 399.
57 Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 91.
58 Id. arts. 18, 20-22.
59 Id. art 23.
60 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 70(1).
61 Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 14.
62 Id. art. 17.
[Vol. 38:363
NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW
63
mothers with infants and young children, among others. Maternity cases
among internees in occupied territory must be admitted to medical facilities
where they may receive adequate care.64 However, they should not be trans-
ferred if it would be detrimental to their health, unless their immediate
safety is at issue.65
As aliens in occupied territory, pregnant women and mothers of
children under the age of seven are to be accorded the same preferential
treatment they would receive if they were nationals.66 Such preferential
treatment may include "the granting of supplementary ration cards, facilities
for medical and hospital treatment, special welfare treatment, exemption
from certain kinds of work, protective measures against the effects of war,
evacuation, transfer to a neutral country, admission to hospital and safety
zones and localities, etc."67 Occupying powers cannot alter preferential
measures that were in effect prior to the occupation for pregnant women and
mothers of children under the age of seven.68
The death penalty is not to be imposed on pregnant women or
women with dependant infants for an offense related to the conflict, "to the
maximum extent feasible 69 Even in internal armed conflict, death
sentences are not to be carried out on pregnant women.7°
Again, similar to the provisions regarding detention, the system for
protection of pregnant women holds many important rules that, if imple-
mented, could undoubtedly contribute toward a decrease in the suffering
women endure during conflict. This code attempts to shield pregnant
women and mothers of small children from harm in a number of practical
ways. However, the Commentary notes that this is because pregnant women
and women with young children are categorized by "weakness mak[ing]
them incapable of contributing to the war potential of their country ....
An additional question surrounds the commingling of the specific
concerns of women, especially pregnant women, with those of children.
Though logistically coherent in some ways, this approach has been prob-
lematized by women's human rights methodology. The category, "women
,,72 *.73and children,' may infantilize women. Meanwhile, the focus on protect-
63 Id. art. 132.
64 Id. art. 91.
65 Id. art. 127.
6 Id. art. 38.
67 Commentary IV, supra note 23, art. 38, at 248-49.
68 Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 50.
69 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 76(3).
70 Protocol II, supra note 24, art. 6(4).
71 Commentary IV, supra note 23, art. 14, 1(2), at 126. See also id. art. 38, at 248.
72 Id. art. 89, 5, at 395 (listing "Women and children" as the heading of the Commen-
tary's discussion of article 89(5)).
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ing future generations associated with the rules related to pregnant women
may also, inadvertently, "instrumentalize" women and their bodies.74 This
brings us to consideration of IHL's norms designed to protect women from
specific types of violence.
2. Protections from Particular Categories of Abuse
a. Rape and Sexual Abuse
A litany of IHL provisions is explicitly designed to protect women
from various forms of sexual violence. One of the essential references is
found in the Fourth Geneva Convention: "Women shall be especially pro-
tected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault."
75
The Commentary interprets this specific proscription as arising
from the general concern for women's honor and "family rights," both
somewhat antiquated notions when used in the context of sexual violence.
However, to be fair, the Commentary also refers in relevant part to respect
for the person and, admittedly, does take a somewhat enlightened approach
to honor. It defines the concept in general as "a moral and social quality.
The right to respect for his honour is a right invested in man because he is
endowed with a reason and a conscience. 76 Furthermore, the Commentary
does express outrage at the sexual atrocities against women during World
War II, which were inadequately prosecuted afterwards. This leads to a
broad condemnation, as follows:
73 As the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women has noted, "it is important
to maintain conceptual clarity in separating the regimes that operate for women and those
that operate for children. Women are adults and should be treated as such in laws, policies
and programmes." The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Integration of
the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women, Adden-
dum: Mission to Bangladesh, Nepal and India on the Issue of Trafficking of Women and
Girls, 25, delivered to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2001/73/Add.2 (Feb. 6, 2001).
74 It is interesting to note that some of the provisions regarding pregnant women, in fact,
were introduced by the International Union for Child Welfare. See, e.g., Commentary IV,
supra note 23, art. 91, 2, at 400.
75 Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 27. This applies to protect women from the agents of
states of which they are not nationals during international armed conflict and occupation
(though the scope has been extended by international criminal jurisprudence).
76 Commentary IV, supra note 23, art. 27 (emphasis added). Here the Commentary dis-
cusses the general view of "honour," not that specifically related to women and sexual vio-
lence. Id. This understanding suggests a greater connection to an alternate dictionary defini-
tion of "honour" to the one cited supra in note 42, namely "honesty, fairness, or integrity in
one's beliefs and actions." This is certainly a preferable meaning, and yet the meaning seems
irrelevant in the context of victims of sexual violence whose behavior is not-or should not
be-in question.
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These acts [rape, enforced prostitution, and any form of indecent assault]
are and remain prohibited in all places and in all circumstances, and
women, whatever their nationality, race, religious beliefs, age, marital
status or social condition have an absolute right to respect for their honour
and their modesty, in short, for their dignity as women.
77
The Commentary's authors seem to have been aware of the problem and
attempted to address it, but they did not supersede the discriminatory social
norms at the time of drafting. While the rights of individual women to main-
tain bodily integrity are implicated, they are almost consistently grounded in
outdated notions of chastity and virtue. Again and again, the four Conven-
tions and the Commentaries state that rape is "an attack on women's hon-
our" or that women should be protected from being "forc[ed] into immoral-
ity by violence. 'T
To achieve these ends, however phrased, women are entitled to spe-
cial protections that are much more helpful than the language used in the
general rules. For example, the ICRC Commentary to the Third Geneva
Convention, Article 14 weaves together a number of specific provisions
toward the prevention of sexual assault of women POWs. These include:
providing separate housing (Art. 25), sanitary installations (Art. 29), and
differential execution of punishment for women prisoners (Art. 108). Addi-
tionally, this encompasses rules protecting prisoners in general from insults
and public curiosity (Art. 13(2)), limiting the nature of questioning and in-
terrogation (Art. 17) and requiring that adequate clothing be provided (Art.
27). Such practical provisions are vital to preventing sexual assaults.
Furthermore, the drafters of the Protocols in the 1970s introduced
language that focuses less on "honor" and more on human dignity: "Women
shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in particular
against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault. 7 9
This provision applies to all women in the territory of parties to the conflict,
whether it be an international conflict or one for self-determination in ac-
cordance with the Protocol I's scope of application.
In non-international armed conflicts, "the following acts against...
[persons taking no part in the hostilities] are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever: ... [o]utrages upon personal dignity,
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitu-
tion and any form of indecent assault . .. ,,80 As with all rules in Protocol II,
this applies to women in specific types of non-international armed conflict.
An analogous rule is found in Protocol 1. However, this rule specifically
77 Id. art27, 2, at207.
78 See, e.g., id. art 27, 2, at 206 (emphasis added).
79 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 76(1).
80 Protocol II, supra note 24, art. 4(2)(e).
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prohibits only "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault
.. " without specific mention of rape.8 l But given the language of Protocol
II, it impliedly includes rape as a form of outrage on personal dignity. Note
further that threats to commit such abuses are also absolutely forbidden.8 2
b. Implied Prohibitions of Rape and Other Sexual Violence in Conflict
The contemporary understanding of rape, by or with the consent or
acquiescence of the state, while in detention, or by organized armed groups
in conflict, is that such abuse constitutes a form of torture.83 Successive UN
Special Rapporteurs on torture have aftirmed that rape in detention is a form
of torture.84 Rape and sexual abuse of women in such contexts also clearly
constitute forms of violence against women. Hence, a number of other pro-
visions of Geneva law may be considered, by implication, to outlaw these
practices. Through progressive interpretation these principles can be har-
nessed to combat such abuse. Unquestionably, explicit inclusion would have
been preferable, but at the very least, these extra provisions can be consid-
ered in evaluating IHL's contemporary responsiveness to women in con-
flict.
The additional articles include those which prohibit the torture of
wounded and sick combatants on land and sea (including torture by enemy
civilians), 5 and those which protect POWs from torture,86 physical mutila-
81 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 75(2)(b). Rape is prohibited, but under a different rubric.
See id. art. 76(1).
82 Id. art. 75(2)(e).
83 Amnesty International has affirmed that:
Under customary international law, many acts of violence against women commit-
ted by parties to a conflict (whether international or internal) constitute torture.
These include rape and gang rape, abduction and sexual slavery, forced marriage,
forced impregnation and forced maternity, sexual mutilation, indecent assault and
many other forms of physical violence.
Amnesty Int'l, Broken Bodies, Shattered Minds: Torture and Ill-Treatment of Women, at 54,
AI Index ACT 40/001/2001, Mar. 8, 2001.
84 The first Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment, Peter Kooijmans, insisted that "[slince it was clear that rape or other forms of
sexual assault against women in detention were a particularly ignominious violation of the
inherent dignity and right to physical integrity of the human being, they accordingly consti-
tuted an act of torture." U.N. Special Rapporteur, Question of the Human Rights of All Per-
sons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, In Particular: Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1 16, delivered to the UN. Com-
mission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/34 (Jan. 12, 1995). The next Special
Rapporteur on torture, Nigel Rodley, cited this approvingly. Id.
85 Geneva I, supra note 22, arts. 12, 18; Geneva II, supra note 22, art. 12.
86 Geneva II, supra note 22, art. 17.
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tion or "acts of violence." 87 Additional relevant prohibitions incorporate
those that require respect for the person of protected persons88 and their
being shielded from any physical suffering, mutilation, 9 or torture,
"whether applied by civilian or military agents." 90
Importantly, in the case of an internal armed conflict, these princi-
ples are echoed by Protocol II and, to some degree, by Common Article 3,
which has a wider sphere of application. For example, Protocol II, Art.
4(2)(a) prohibits torture, mutilation, and other forms of violence against
those hors de combat, as does Common Article 3.91 Protocol II, Art. 7 holds
that the wounded, the sick, and the shipwrecked shall be respected, pro-
tected, and treated humanely. Individual civilians are not to be attacked; nor
are acts or threats of violence (including sexual violence) for the purpose of
spreading terror among the civilian population to be tolerated.92 Under the
dictates of Common Article 3(c), "outrages upon personal dignity, in par-
ticular humiliating and degrading treatment" are utterly impermissible. Pro-
tections from violence to health and physical and mental well-being, and
prohibitions of torture, cruel treatment, and slavery and the slave trade are
all found in Protocol 11. 93 Respect, humane treatment, and non-
discriminatory treatment of persons not taking part in the hostilities are
mandated.
94
D. Rules Covering Abuses that Disproportionately Impact Women
The Beijing Platform for Action noted that "[c]ivilian victims,
mostly women and children, often outnumber casualties among combat-
ants. 95 Gardam and Jarvis have argued that the Geneva law principle that is
most important for women during the conduct of hostilities is what they
term "non-combatant immunity." 9 As a cornerstone of IHL, also known as
the principle of distinction, it requires parties to the conflict to distinguish
between civilians and combatants at all times and to refrain from deliber-
ately or indiscriminately attacking the former.
87 Id. art. 13.
88 Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 27.
89 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 75(2)(a)(iv).
90 Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 32. See also Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 75(2)(a)(ii).
91 Geneva I, supra note 22, art. 3(1)(a); Geneva II, supra note 22, art. 3(1)(a); Geneva III,
supra note 22, art. 3(1)(a); Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 3(1)(a).
92 Protocol II, supra note 24, art. 13.
93 Protocol II, supra note 24, art. 4(2)(a) & (f).
94 Id. art. 4(l).
95 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 15, 133.
96 GARDAM & JARvIS, supra note 9, at 68.
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Protocol I offers detailed rules for how this principle is to be im-
plemented during conflicts within its scope and so may be seen as particu-
larly important for women.97 Article 51 of Protocol I prohibits: direct at-
tacks on civilians; acts with the purpose of spreading terror among civilians;
reprisals against civilians and using civilians as shields for military opera-
tions.9 8 Significantly, it also forbids indiscriminate attacks. 99 Indiscriminate
attacks are those that do not specifically aim for a particular military target,
or employ an inherently indiscriminate method or means, or which treat a
group of military targets, even if separated by civilian areas, as one.1°° Arti-
cle 5 1(5)(b) of Protocol I also elaborates the crucial principle of proportion-
ality that prohibits "[a]n attack which may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a com-
bination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated."'' ° To the military thinker, this may
seem like a tremendous concession of strategic choices for considerations of
humanity. To the human rights lawyer, these rules do not approach suffi-
cient protection of any civilian persons, regardless of gender, in time of war
and rather reflect IHL's inherent, arguably requisite, concessions to military
necessity. 102 Nevertheless, given the large number of women (and girls)
who are among the civilian casualties of military attacks versus the over-
whelmingly male composition of the militaries making those attacks and
political leaderships ordering them, it is indeed possible to link an overarch-
ing critique of these aspects of IHL to the gender critique.
Furthermore, in non-international armed conflict, the most common
form in our time, the conventional rules governing the means and methods
of combat offer even less protection, leaving women particularly vulnerable.
Protocol II, Art. 13 provides general norms to protect the civilian population
from the effects of conflict. 10 3 It prohibits the direct targeting of civilians
and the use of acts of violence or threats thereof to terrorize the civilian
population.1°4 However, as Gardam and Jarvis have noted, "Protocol II con-
tains no specific limitations on the means and methods of combat. There is
no prohibition against indiscriminate attacks or any requirement as to pro-
97 Protocol I, supra note 24, arts. 48-58.
98 Id. arts. 5 1(2), (6) & (7).
99 Id. art. 51(4).
1OO Id.
10 Id. art. 51(5)(b).
102 See e.g., Bennoune, supra note 4, at 187-90.
103 See Protocol II, supra note 24, art. 13.
104 T,4
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portionality, no prohibition on the civilian population being used as a shield
against military operations, and no prohibition against reprisals."'
0 5
E. Women and Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol I
Violations of Geneva law may be divided into grave breaches, spe-
cifically enumerated in the four conventions and Protocol I, and other acts
contrary to the provisions of the Conventions and Protocols. With regard to
grave breaches, all state parties must enact laws that give rise to individual
criminal responsibility, both for those who have ordered and those who
have committed such breaches. States are required to actively search for
alleged perpetrators (including those who gave the orders) and exercise ju-
risdiction over any such persons found, or turn them over to another state
that will do so.
There is no explicit reference to gender-based harms in the list of
grave breaches in the Conventions and Protocol 1. This is perhaps the aspect
of LHL most criticized by women's human rights experts, as it seems to
reflect the insufficient level of gravity with which such harms were regarded
at the time the instruments were adopted. However, the torture of women
and "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health" to
women protected persons are clearly grave breaches of these treaties. 10 6 In
light of progressive interpretation, these categories undoubtedly include
rape and many other forms of sexual abuse, such as sexual mutilation. A
number of other provisions of arguable relevance to violence against
women in wartime are included, such as those in the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention, art. 147. For example, its extension of grave breach status to
unlawful deportation or transfer and unlawful confinement of a protected
person may be of particular relevance with regard to gender-based abuses
like sexual slavery and trafficking in women.
10 7
In addition, with regard to the principle of distinction, vital for
many women, Protocol I, Art. 85 confers grave breach status on making the
civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack; launching an
indiscriminate attack knowing this will cause excessive loss to civilians; and
105 GARDAM & JARvIs, supra note 9, at 71. Conventional norms regulating the conduct of
internal armed conflict should be understood in the context of developing customary rules in
the area. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has made a significant contri-
bution in this regard. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened
for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; see also Protocol II, supra note 24, prmbl.
(reiterating the Martens clause, which may help further fill in this gap).
106 Geneva I, supra note 22, art. 50; Geneva II, supra note 22, art. 51, Geneva III, supra
note 22, art. 130. See also YOUGINDRA KHUSHALANI, DIGNITY AND HONOUR OF WOMEN AS
BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 71-72 (1982).
107 See Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 147.
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attacking a person knowing that "he" is hors de combat.108 Neither Common
Article 3 nor Protocol II contains any explicit grave breach provisions. Ex-
perts have decried the fairly universal failure to enforce these standards with
regard to most allegations of grave breaches, including those committed
against women.109
IV. A SUMMARY OF THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF IHL
Based on the above summary, the gender-specific problems with
humanitarian law identified by critics can largely be summarized as follows.
Archaic views about honor and modesty pepper the gender-related Geneva
provisions, and especially the relevant Commentaries. The emphasis on
honor is especially offensive since it may imply that a woman survivor of
wartime rape or other sexual violence is dishonored, a powerful notion
fraught with terrible real world consequences for the woman and her family.
Stereotyped notions of the relative weakness of women versus the stronger
male pervade these provisions and the Commentaries; though well-
intentioned, these assumptions may but perpetuate discriminatory thinking
about these problems.
Further, the fact that rape and sexual violence are gender crimes is
not fully conveyed nor is their obviously violent nature. Rhonda Copelon
has problematized the separate categorization of sexual assault from other
violent crimes, such as murder and torture which are dealt with in distinct
articles." 0 This cloaks the reality which the international community now
recognizes through human rights standards, that such abuses represent vio-
lence against women and an assault on their very personhood. As Copelon
says, "[t]his failure to recognize rape as violence is critical to the tradition-
ally lesser or ambiguous status of rape in humanitarian law.""'
Other failings of IHL, as catalogued by feminist experts, include
that less protection is offered in internal armed conflict, the most prevalent
type of strife in the contemporary period. The focus of women's IHL is seen
to fall narrowly on sexual violence and pregnancy, rather than having a
sense of the panoply of violence which befalls women in conflict. More-
over, no explicit connection is made to the impact of underlying discrimina-
tion against women on perpetuating and exacerbating such horrors. 1 2 In
108 Protocol I, supra note 24, arts. 85(3)(a), (b) & (e).
109 See, e.g., FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF
WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 68 (1987). The record has
improved only somewhat since that volume, published by the ICRC, appeared.
110 See Copelon, supra note 13, at 249.
111 Id.
112 For a response to this criticism, suggesting that IHL can not and should not address "the
basis of social structure in general," see Helen Durham, Women, Armed Conflict and lnterna-
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light of our current understandings of conflict violence against women, this
last point is potentially among the most troublesome. Finally, another prob-
lem is the lack of adequate standards applicable to the post-conflict situa-
tion, a perilous time for women.
Proponents of IHL might respond that some of this criticism is
based on unfair expectations and that it overlooks IHL's necessary parame-
ters and mission. Furthermore, the specific, technical rules of IHL govern-
ing treatment of women do offer much potential protection. These rules
indicate more awareness of the difficulties women face in conflict than
some of the problematic general statements in IHL discussed above might
suggest. If changes are made to address the gender failings of IHL, we must
carefully avoid undermining the good there is in the current system for
women.
V. Do GENDER INSUFFICIENCIES IN CONVENTIONAL IHL MATTER IN THE
ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?
Before suggesting changes that could be made to correct problems
identified above, we must consider the continuing relevance of conventional
IHL in the post-Rome Statute era. Some would argue that international
criminal law has rendered many of these issues obsolete. Thanks to the vig-
orous efforts of women's groups and other NGOs, the Rome Statute con-
tains a range of gender-specific provisions. To a lesser degree, the statutes
of the ad hoc criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia also
contain such provisions. As a result of the progressive jurisprudence of the
ad hoc tribunals, rape can now be prosecuted as a crime against humanity, a
war crime, and even as a method of genocide in international tribunals. Ef-
forts have been made to ensure prosecutions of perpetrators of gender-based
crimes by affording support to victims and witnesses. Even a critic like
Copelon concedes that "[p]rosecuting rape as a grave breach should effec-
tively expand the meaning of the Conventions and Protocols and obviate the
need for formal amendment."'"13 Yet, in the future, failings in IHL may be
reflected in international criminal practice, such as the faults identified by
Copelon with the early indictments concerning sexual violence that were
submitted to the ICTY1 4 (though hopefully this danger may be minimized
as international criminal jurisprudence and practice develops inexorably)." 5
tional Law, 84 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 655, 657 (2002) (reviewing GARDAM & JARvS,
supra note 9).
113 Copelon, supra note 13, at 254.
114 See id. at 253-56 (criticizing, in one instance, the failure to charge sexual violence
against women as torture, when sexual mutilation of men was so charged).
15 See generally KELLY DAWN ASKiN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (1997).
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International criminal courts can indeed promote progressive, crea-
tive interpretations of IHL's key texts. Theodor Meron, among others, has
called for sustained efforts in this direction.1 6 Experts and NGOs have also
pushed for these developments. The ICRC has made some important contri-
butions as, for example, in its 1992 aide-memoire. This document pro-
claimed that "[t]he act of rape is an extremely serious violation of interna-
tional humanitarian law" and indicated that the grave breach of "willfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health" found in Article
147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention includes rape and "any other attack
on a woman's dignity."
'
"1 7
However, the nature of conventional IHL remains vitally important,
per se, for those women, whose conflict victimization will not be subject to
the jurisdiction of any international criminal court (an unfortunately large
number). Their only legal recourse, if any, may be ad hoc, perhaps through
national courts, most likely based directly on IHL, particularly when involv-
ing states that oppose international tribunals. Additionally, some militaries
base their training programs directly on IHL, sometimes going so far as to
incorporate its provisions directly into instruction manuals." 8 The ICRC
introduction to the Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention ex-
presses hope "that the Commentary will be of service to all who, in Gov-
ernments, armed forces and national Red Cross Societies, are called upon to
assume responsibility in applying the Geneva Conventions, and to all, mili-
tary and civilians, for whose benefit the Conventions were drawn up."'"19
Thus ideas about women conveyed in such a source may well still have real-
world, battlefield relevance.
Moreover, IHL remains a touchstone, a source to which govern-
ments, national courts, and international courts and mechanisms will always
return. Given the fact that in 2006 the Geneva Conventions became the first
treaties "in modem history to achieve universal acceptance" 20 by being
ratified by all 194 countries in the world, their symbolic importance cannot
be overstated. They have legitimacy even with some governments that re-
116 See Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 424, 426-28 (1993).
117 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, Aide-M6moire, para. 2 (Dec. 3, 1992)
(on file with the author).
118 See generally THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A
NUTSHELL 317 (3d. ed., West Group 2002) (1988) (discussing this practice and providing
citations to relevant materials).
119 Commentary IV, supra note 23, at 2 (referring to the foreword produced by the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross).
120 See Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, A milestone for international humanitarian law, ICRC,
Sept. 22, 2006, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/geneva-conventions-stateme
nt-220906?opendocument.
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main hostile to international criminal law and international criminal courts.
Therefore, what IHL says about women in war remains significant. Progres-
sive adjudication should be encouraged and welcomed. Yet, creatively
patching together interpretations of texts to find space for women's experi-
ences of war may not ultimately be enough.
VI. CONCLUSION
Feminist critics of international humanitarian law suggest several
possible strategies to address the gender deficiencies they identify in IHL,
including (1) law reform through new treaties or other international stan-
dards on women and armed conflict, or (2) written reinterpretation of exist-
ing provisions with an updated perspective on gender. This article aims to
consider these proposals in light of the theoretical critique outlined above.
However, in the current moment such analysis must also be considered in
light of imperative political and practical concerns. Thus, the following dis-
cussion is informed by Durham's observation that feminist academic and
operational perspectives may have divergent perspectives and priorities but
are equally focused on "the general aim of reducing suffering .... ,,121
Possibilities for reform in the treaty area which have been dis-
cussed, but whose individual merits cannot get full consideration here for
lack of space, include drafting a Third Additional Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 on the protection of women in time of conflict.122 An-
other idea that has been suggested is to draft a Convention on Violence
Against Women, perhaps based in part on the General Assembly Declara-
tion on the same topic. This could include violence in conflict and would
address lacunae in existing treaty law both in the area of human rights and
humanitarian law. Alternatively, such an instrument could be appended as a
Second Optional Protocol to the Women's Convention. 23 In that case, the
CEDAW Committee would monitor its implementation. It could also be
subjected to the individual complaints and inquiry procedures available in
the current Optional Protocol to the Women's Convention, thus helping to
develop jurisprudence in the area. 24
Some important voices have recently-and unofficially-suggested
exploring the possibility of a specific international standard on rape or on
121 Durham, supra note 112, at 655.
122 See, e.g., Judith Gardam, Women and the Law of Armed Conflict: Why the Silence?, 46
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 55, 77 (1997).
123 See GARDAM & JARviS, supra note 9, at 256 (discussing the option of appending a Sec-
ond Optional Protocol to the Women's Convention).
124 See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, art. 8, adopted Oct. 6, 1999 (appended to General Assembly Resolu-
tion 54/4 of Oct. 15, 1999).
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sexual violence. 125 Instead of constantly trying to elevate the status of rape
by analogy to other atrocities such as torture, rape itself would thereby gar-
ner the international stigma that it deserves.
In a perfect world, rectifying the gender problems inherent in IHL
might be easier. Humanitarian law could simply be redrafted to reflect the
contemporary understandings of why and how violence happens to women
in war and how best to prevent and punish it, calling upon recent interna-
tional human rights standards. However, currently, the basic principles of
IHL are under attack from governments, especially those engaged in the
"war against terrorism."'126 Moreover, the contemporary political problems
are not confined to the world of IlL and terrorism. Some feel that today it
would be difficult to achieve a consensus on texts such as the Declaration
on Violence against Women or the Beijing Platform for Action, each only a
little more than a decade old. Thus, reopening the basic principles of the
existing texts in this vital area of law by drafting a new instrument is a high
stakes project. 127 There is the chance that in the contemporary environment
it could result in a weakening of the protections available, a reality of which
feminist scholars are clearly aware. 128 Also, tremendous resources would be
needed to make such a document a reality. For now, the possibility of de-
veloping or redrafting treaties may only be realistic as a long-term goal.
However, in the long run, this writer supports the Gardam idea of drafting
an instrument and appending it to the Geneva Conventions themselves, be-
cause mainstreaming advances in women's human rights is a necessity. The
ICRC should, of course, be thoroughly consulted about any such project.
In the meantime, noting the plethora of "soft law" standards which
have been produced in this field in recent years, scholars have suggested the
possibility of a comprehensive instrument of this nature.' 29 It would draw
125 This was most recently suggested in the presence of the author by a prominent figure in
international criminal practice at an off-the-record NGO consultation during summer 2003.
126 See, e.g., Gabor Rona, Interesting Times For International Humanitarian Law: Chal-
lenges from the "War on Terror," 27 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. (ISSUE 2) 55 (2003).
127 A further counterpoint is to be found in the question posed by former Payam Akhavan,
Legal Advisor to the Office of the Prosecutor for the ad hoc tribunals. Akhavan asks: "By
expanding the ambit of humanitarian protection, do we risk creating a law that is more in the
tendency of a utopia in the sense that it does not remotely reflect what states are actually
willing to concede?" Payam Akhavan, The Dilemmas of Jurisprudence, 13 AM. U. INT'L. L.
REV. 1518, 1520 (1997-1998).
128 GARDAM & JARvIs, supra note 9, at 256.
129 See, e.g., GARDAM & JARViS, supra note 9, at 257. Soft law sources which could feed
into this new standard include some cited above. See, e.g., Declaration, supra note 19; the
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 15; General Recommendation No.
19, supra note 16; Security Council Resolution 1325, supra note 7. Other soft law sources
which could also feed into this new standard include recommendations made in numerous
reports by UN human rights treaty bodies, CEDAW in particular, by the Special Rapporteur
on violence against women and those from the Independent Experts. See, e.g., Special Rap-
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the others together and serve as a kind of focal point. This project could take
the form of a General Assembly resolution or Guiding Principles on Women
and Armed Conflict, inspired by the analogous standard prepared on inter-
nal displacement.130 Given that 2009 will be the thirty-fifth anniversary of
the 1974 General Assembly Declaration on the Protection of Women and
Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, 31 perhaps it would be an ideal
moment for such an effort. This kind of text, representing an important step
toward codification of such norms in the long run, can help, in the words of
Rhonda Copelon, to " 'surface' gender.. ." in international humanitarian
law and thus, in our official conceptions of the rules of conflict. 32 A proc-
ess recommended recently by UNIFEM's Independent Experts on "Women,
War and Peace," whereby the UN Secretary-General would appoint "a panel
of experts to assess the gaps in international . .. laws and standards pertain-
ing to the protection of women in conflict and post-conflict situations..."
porteur's Report, supra note 9, at 140-48. For additional standards, see also, International
Conference on Population and Development, Sept. 5-13, 1994, Cairo Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 171/13 (Oct. 18, 1994) and the United Nations Tran-
sitional Assistance Group [UNTAG], Windhoek Declaration on "Mainstreaming a Gender
Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations, " (May 31, 2000), available at
http://www.peacewoman.org/un/pkwatch/WindhoekDeclaration.html. Standards related to
refugee and displaced women can also make great contributions. See U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNCHR), Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, (July 1991),
available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/LGEL-5DVBVN/$FILE/unhcr-gu
idewomenref-jul9l.pdf; UNHCR, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence against Refugees,
Returnees, and Internally Displaced Persons: Guidelines on Prevention and Responses (May
2003 ed.) (1995), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?
tbl=PROTECTION&id=3f696bcc4.
130 See generally The Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Representative
of the Secretary-General on the Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work
of the Commission, Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/53/add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998). Gardam and Jarvis offer a draft which could poten-
tially serve as an initial basis for work in this area. GARDAM & JARVIS, supra note 9, at 58-
64. In their book, they also endorse the Deng principles as a useful model. Id. at 257.
131 Born out of the work of the UN Commission on the Status of Women on the subject at
sessions in 1972 and 1974, the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in
Emergency and Armed Conflict was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December
1974. G.A. Res. 3318 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec.
14, 1974), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/24.htm. The aim of the declara-
tion is to "provide special protection of women and children belonging to the civilian popula-
tion." Id. pmbl. Though it does not make specific reference to rape, sexual assault or other
gender-based violence, it is significant because it represents the first real recognition within
the UN system of the need to address the specific threats to women in armed conflict. Inno-
vatively, for its time, the declaration deems "criminal" repression, cruel and inhuman treat-
ment, imprisonment, torture, shooting, mass arrests, collective punishment, destruction of
dwellings, and forcible eviction of women and children. Id. 5.
132 Copelon, supra note 13, at 247.
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could help shape such a new instrument. 133 Further, the development of
such a soft-law standard could dovetail nicely with another proposal the
Independent Experts made that an international Truth and Reconciliation
Commission on violence against women in armed conflict be convened.
134
The idea of updating the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions
and Protocols from a gender-sensitive perspective has also garnered wide-
spread support as a way of addressing the problems outlined in this arti-
cle. 135 The Special Rapporteur on violence against women, among others,
has implicitly endorsed this idea.' 36 Such a revision of the Commentaries
could represent an important way to address feminist concerns. However,
any such updating should most likely take the form of a supplement to the
existing Commentaries. This would avoid undermining the overall legiti-
macy of the Commentaries or needlessly calling into question important
issues that have been satisfactorily resolved therein.
One may be told that law reform, particularly in the IHL area,
should not be a high priority in combating international crimes against
women. Serious concerns have been raised about the potential triumph of
"form over substance."'137 Yet, in thinking about the role of law in stopping
violence against women in armed conflict, it is instructive to note that ac-
cording to the Beijing Platform for Action, violence against women is exac-
erbated by: "the lack of laws that effectively prohibit violence against
women; [and] failure to reform existing laws ... ,,138
What the law designed to protect women says about women and the
nature of the risks they face will shape the ways in which military forces are
trained, the ways in which crimes against women are understood, and
whether or not those crimes are prevented and prosecuted. That law should
reflect advanced understandings of violence against women. Much progress
has been made in human rights standards in reflecting the nature of violence
against women, including in conflict. However, many of these advances
remain ghettoized. For example, the literature on women in armed conflict
133 REHN & SIRLEAF, supra note 9, at 140.
134 Id.
135 See GARDAM & JARvIs, supra note 9, at 258 (discussing revisions to the Commentaries
of the four Geneva Conventions and Protocols).
136 "Existing humanitarian legal standards should be evaluated and practices revised to
incorporate developing norms on violence against women during armed conflict." The U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Further Promotion and Encouragement of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and
Methods of Work of the Commission: Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within
the United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, 95, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (Jan. 26, 1998)
137 See Christine Chinkin, Feminist Interventions into International Law, 19 ADEL. L. REV.
13, 18 (1997).
138 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 15, 118.
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and humanitarian law is excellent and rich, but almost totally separate from
other conflict literature. Thus, the otherwise authoritative, "Handbook of
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts," published in 1995 (the year of the
UN Fourth World Conference on Women which produced the Beijing Plat-
form for Action), includes no writing by female contributors, and for a book
of six hundred pages contains only two specific references to women in its
index. 39
Every possible method must be utilized to bring the advances made
in the area of women's human rights to bear on the mainstream understand-
ing of IHL. Still, paying heed to the ongoing important work of the ICRC
and its views articulated at the start of this article, any such efforts under-
taken must be balanced with a significant emphasis on full and universal
implementation of existing technical rules of IHL. Despite deficiencies in
the overall framework, this would go a long way toward greater protection
for women in conflict.
139 See THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS (Dieter Fleck ed.,
1995).
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